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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ROBERT E. SIMMONS, CHARRIE BRENNAN, DAVID A. WILLIAMS, LOUIE A.
SHORT, PATRICIAL L. CASTILLO,
BETH L. HURST, and JAY EZRA REA,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.

Case No.
11771

STATE OF UTAH, Department of Public
Safety, Financial Responsibility Division,
Defendant-Appellant.

Petition and Brief for Rehearing
Plaintiffs in the above entitled matter hereby
petition the Supreme Court of the State of Utah for
a rehearing of the decision heretofore rendered in
this case which was filed on the 1st day of April,
1970, on the grounds that: (1) the Court failed to
comprehend the full scope of the statutory investigative duties of the Financial Responsibility Division and the statutory limits on the agency's acting
on the acquired information; and (2) the Court's
Order enforcing the Order of Suspension fails to
consider the remaining cause of action in the respondents' Complaints which was not considered
by the District Court, to wit: whether or not there

2

was a probability of liability on the part of each of
these plaintiffs, and this matter if the Opion of April '
1st 1970 is not altered should now be remanded to
the District Court for further consideration with the
stays heretofore being granted being kept in full
force and effect until said matters are heard by the
District Court.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS'
PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This case concerns the legality of eight driver's
license revocations by the appellant State of Utah
under the Utah Financial Responsibility Laws, Sections 41-12-1, et. seq., Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended.
PRIOR DISPOSITION
Each of the respondents, an uninsured motorist,
was involved in an automobile accident. Acting upon the information available to it, the official reports
required and authorized by Sections 41-6-35 through
40, Utc.h Code Annotated 1953, the Financial Responsibility Division of the Department of Public
Safety issued an Order to each of the respondents
requiring in the alternative either a security deposit
or the suspension of their drivers' licenses. Pursuant
to Section 41-12-2(b), Utah Code Annotated 1953,
s3.id Orders were appealed to the Third Judicial DisLf'.cr Court, \'\'here, after review of the cases, )l1cig2
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Bryant H. Croft ordered the permanent injunction of
each of the Orders on the grounds that provisions
of Section 41-12-5(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953
would not permit the appellant to issue such orders
solely upon the basis of the official reports submitted
to the Financial Responsibility Division. This decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah, which by Opinion filed April 1st, 1970,
reversed the decision of Judge Croft and ordered
the Orders enforced.
I

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondents in this action were all uninsured motorists who were involved in automobile
accidents. Upon the receipts of the various reports
required and authorized by the provisions of Sections 41-6-35 through 40 and Sections 41-12-1, et seq.,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, the Financial Responsibility Division of the Department of Public Safety
determined that in each accident, there was personal injury or property damage in excess of $100.00,
and, after determining the precise amount required
to be posted as security in each instance, ordered
each of the respondents to post that amount of security or suffer the suspension of their drivers' licenses
and motor vehicle registrations. There was no determination of either the probability of responsibility
or whether any injured party desired the issuance
of the Orders. The Orders were appealed pursuant
to Section 41-12-2(b), Utah Code Annotated 1953, to
the District Court, which enjoined those Orders on
the ground that such an Order requiring either the

posting of security or suffering suspension of
driver's license could not be issued if only the official reports had been submitted to the Commission.1 Judge Croft ruled that the provisions of Section
41-12-S(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, required that
evidence in addition to these reports had to be submitted by an injured party or on his behalf before
the Commission was authorized to issue such an
Order. That decision was reversed by this Court in
its decision of April 1st, 1970.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
- Respondents seek a reversal of the Opinion
rendered by this Court on April 1st, 1970, and the affirming of Judge Croft's holding that the evidence
submitted to the Commission was not sufficient under the laws of Utah to require the issuing of the
Orders requiring the posting of security or suspension of driver's license of each of the respondents,
or in the alternative, a modification of the Order of
the Court requiring these matters remanded to the
District Court for further proceedings on the allegations of the Complaints that there is no probability
that the respondents will be responsible for the accidents. This issue was not considered by the
District Court because it found no reason to consider
these allegations after rendering the initial decision
in this manner.
l"Commission" is defined in Section 41-12-l(a), Utah Code Annotated
1953, as "The department of public safety" and as used in this brief
shall refer to the Financial Responsibility Division of the Department
of Public Safety.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ERRED IN ITS DECISION OF APRIL !ST, 1970, IN
THIS MATIER IN THAT THE COURT FAILED TO
COMPREHEND THE FULL SCOPE OF THE STATUTORY INVESTIGATIVE DUTIES OF THE FINANCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY DIVISION AND THE STATUTORY
LIMITS ON THE AGENCY'S ACTING ON THE
ACQUIRED INFORMATION.

In the Opinion of April 1st, 1970, Justice Ellett,
speaking for the Court, stated regarding the crucial
language of Section 41-12-5(a), Utah Code Annotated
1953:
"The commission shall determine the
amount of security deposited upon the
basis of the reports or other evidence submitted to it but shall not require a deposit
or security for the benefit of any person
when evidence has not been submitted by
such person or on his behalf as to the
extent of his injuries or damage to his
property within fifty (50) days following the day of accident.... " (Emphasis
added)
"The underscored portion of the sentence
indicates that someone other than the driver
may also be able to satisfy any judgment recovered by him from the security posted but
only if such other person files his proof within
50 days from the accident. These other people,
such as passengers in the car, pedestrians, and
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nondriving owners, are not required by the
statute to file a report, but if they are to take
advantage of the security, they must file proof
of their damage within 50 days." (Emphasis
added)

It would be respectfully submitted that this rationale
and holding on the part of the Court is in error, because it fails to comprehend the full scope of the
statutory investigative duties of the Commission and
the statutory limits on the Commission taking action
on the acquired information.
The key to understanding the dual nature of the
Commission under the Motor Vehicle Code in the
Financial Responsibility area is Section 41-6-40, Utah
Code Annotated 1953. That statute states:
"All accident reports made by persons involved in accidents or by garages will be without
prejudice to the individual so reporting and
shall be for the confidential use of the department or other state agencies having use for the
records for accident prevention purposes, or for
the administration of the laws of this state relating to the deposit of security and proof of financial responsibility by persons driving or the
owners of motor vehicles . ... " (Emphasis added)

It is clear from this provisions that the Commission
has two statutory duties it must fulfill from the reports it is to gather as provided in Sections 41-6-3:1
through 40, Utah Code Annotated 1953. It is to ev'!l1
lhem
accident prevention purposes and to
e.: se th'c :Jn us a basis to enforce the financial respon-
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sibility laws. In so doing, it must require reports
from all witnesses to an accident. Section 41-6-35(b),
Utah Code Annotated 1953. The language of that
statute is "may", but as will be pointed out infra,
the information of all witnesses must be obtained
if the Commission is to carry out its proper statutory
function. This gathering of information has in turn
two aspects. The first is a determination of what
occurred. The second is what are the consequences
of those events.
In determining what occurred, the Commission
uses the reports to see what could have been done
to prevent the accident-what caused it. Then, it
reports its findings to the Legislature in the form of
recommended changes in the Motor Vehicle Code.
In the area of fin an c i a 1 responsibility, the
Commission determines if there is a probability of
responsibility. If there is, and the driver is either
without insurance or not covered by one of the exceptions of Section 41-12-6, Utah Code Annotated
1953, an Order requiring either the posting of security or suspension of the driver's license of the operator may be issued if the other conditions of the
Financial Responsibility Laws are complied with by
the Commission. Hague v. Department of Public Safety,
________ Utah 2d. ________ , 462 P.2d 418 (1969).
However, the Commission to determine fully
what occurred must inquire fully into all the dam3ges
resulting from the accident. It must find out th2
extent of the injuries of everyone injured by the
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accident. 2 If it does not do so, it will not be properly
carrying out the legislative command to work on
accident prevention because it will not know everything about the accident. Even more to the current point of inquiry, it will not be able to require
the culpable uninsured individual to post sufficient
security to "satisfy any judgment or judgments for
damages resulting from such accident." (Emphasis
added) Section 41-12-5(a), Utah Code Annotated
1953. The Commission must determine the extent
and value of all damages to every party injured in an
accident in order to carry out its mandate. It is to use
the reports required and autohrized by Sections 416-35 through 40, Utah Code Annotated 1953, to make
this determination. Sections 41-12-4 and 5(a), Utah
Code Annotated 1953. To carry out this function,
the Commission is authorized to require a report
from all witnesses. Section 41-6-35(b), Utah C ode
Annotated 1953. This term "witness" means anyone
who can provide information about an accident.
This includes damages as well as events and this
provision has been so construed by the Commission
which has sent personal injury reports to treating
physicians (e.g. Williams). It also sends damage reports to damaged third parties, e.g., Utah Power and
Light Co., if one of their poles is struck during the
course of an accident, even though there is no
specific authority to do so elsewhere in the Motor
2An example of this type of inquiry are the current laws regarding
seat belts, flasher lights, etc., all of which come from inquiries into
accidents. The laws regarding seat belts come from investigating injuries while those regarding flashers come from inquiries into the
causes of accidents.
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Vehicle Code. In sum, anyone who is injured must
be asked about his injury if the amount of security
to be required is to be set at a level sufficiently high
to "satisfy any judgment or judgments." Thus, any .znd
all injured parties must be sent report forms by the
the Commission if it is to accurately set the level of
security to be required. This is the meaning not only
of Section 41-6-35(b), Utah Code Annotated 1953, it
is also the meaning of Section 41-12-5(a), Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as clear from the language "judgment or judgments."
Accordingly, the error in the Court's prior Opinion is clear. The Court felt that injured nonparties
(i.e., passengers, pedestrians, and nondriving owners) were not required to file reports and the language "for the benefit of any person" referred to
them. It does not. These persons must be required to
submit reports if the Commission carries out its statutory duties. 3
The Commission, having completed its required
investigations, may issue an Order only if the injured party or parties desire the issuance of such an
Order and file proof of their damages in accordance
with the statute to invoke it. The language of Section
41-12-S(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953:
"The commission shall determine the amount
of security deposited upon the basis of the re3Jt should be noted by the Court that the construction of the statute
articulated by the Court was never put forward by the appellant at
any stage of these proceedings. This is because the Commission interpreted the statute as has been outlined above and they have acted
accordingly.
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ports or other evidence submitted to it but
shall not require a deposit of security for the
benefit of any person when evidence has not
been submitted by such person or on his behalf
as to the extent of his injuries or damage to his
property within fifty (50) days following the
day of accident . . . . " (Emphasis added)

requires this Court to hold that before the Commission is empowered to issue an Order requiring
either the posting of security or the suspension of a
driver's license, the party entitled to and for whose
benefit such an order is to be issued must act affirmatively by submitting evidence of his damage. 4
POINT II.
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
THE AFFIRMATION OF THE ORDERS OF THE DEFENDANT INSTEAD OF REMANDING THEM FOR
FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY THE DISTRICT
COURT.

In the Complaints filed in the District Court in
each of these matters, it was alleged that each of the
respondents would not be found responsible for
damages as a result of the accident in which they
were involved. Each of these cases was decided before the publication of the Opinion of this Court in
Hague v. Department of Public Safety, ________ Utah 2d. _____ ... ,
462 P.2d 418 (1969), and when Judge Croft decided
these cases, he held no evidence for the injured
drivers having been submitted to the Commission,
4The detailed arguments in support of this having been presented to
this Court in the Respondents' Brief, will not be set forth in full
here.

11
the Orders were invalid, and, therefore, he had n0
reason to consider the issue of responsibility. Accordingly, each of these cases should be remanded
for further hearings on the issue of the responsibility
of each of the respondents for damages if the Court
does not reverse itself as has been heretofore urged,
for further determination as to whether or not orders
should be enforced or stayed.
CONCLUSION
In the Opinion filed April 1st, 1970, the Court
erred in failing to properly comprehend the full
scope of the investigatory functions of the Department of Public Safety and the statutory limits on the
Commission's ability to act on the acquired information. Accordingly, when the statutes are properly
viewed and construed, the Court should reverse its
decision of April 1st, 1970, and affirm the decision of
Judge Croft. However, if the Court determines not
to so reconsider this matter, it should then, rather
than enforcing the Order as was done in the Opinion
of April 1st, 1970, remand each of these cases for
further consideration of the issue of responsibility in
the District Court.
Respectfully submitted,
DAYID S. DOLOWITZ
Salt Lake County Bar Legal
Services
Attorney for Respondents
F. ROBERT REEDER
Attorney for Respondent
Jay Ezra Rea

